By Lloyd Benedict
The fast answer is, typically, no; however, there may be a set of facts that prove otherwise. Specifically, the landlord may be responsible for his or her tenant’s dogs if it can be proven that the landlord knew the tenant had a dog, and the landlord also knew that the dog was known to be vicious. Since 1987, Oklahoma has had a series of dog attack cases where the victims have attempted to hold someone other than the actual dog owner responsible for their injuries. Obviously, these cases arise because the actual dog owner does not have insurance or assets compared to what a landlord may have.
Before you pass judgment on what you may think is a money hungry plaintiff, one must understand that when a victim has been mangled in an animal attack, the medical bills can add up to tens of thousands of dollars. In any event, careful analysis should be given to the history of the cases upon which the courts rely to address this issue.
To examine our courts’ thinking, the first case to discuss occurred in Tulsa in 1987, cited as Hampton v. Hammons. In Hampton, a 7-year-old neighbor climbed over a defective fence owned by the Hamptons. At that time, the Hamptons were temporarily taking care of their son’s dog who lived elsewhere. The child was not considered a trespasser as he had been in the Hamptons’ yard before, retrieving toys and such, but this time the child became entangled in the dog’s chain, resulting in an attack on the child.
In short, the Court held that there was evidence that the attack occurred without provocation, that the child was not trespassing, and that the Hamptons were still liable even though they were not the dog’s owner. The Court mainly ruled this way because of how Tulsa’s ordinance then defined “owner” and “vicious dog.” Specifically, in 1987, the Ordinance stated: “‘Owner’ shall mean and include the owner of any dog, cat, animal or domestic animal as herein defined and also every other person having the care or custody of or harboring, keeping or maintaining any dog, cat, animal or domestic animal.”
The Court also determined that the dog was considered a vicious dog because it was a breed that had the propensity to be vicious, and the method of it being chained with another dog fueled that propensity. Most importantly, the Court ultimately determined that “one who undertakes to control the dog’s actions, may be considered to be the owner within the meaning of the law.”
After the Hampton case, the question then became whether a Landlord would be considered the owner of a vicious dog within the meaning of the law. This theory was then tested in 1994, in Bishop v. Carroll. In Bishop, the defendant, Irene Carroll, purchased a house in Oklahoma City as a residence for her daughter, Renee. The daughter lived in the house a short time and then rented it to acquaintances, the VanScoys, who had three children and three Rottweilers, including the dog involved in the attack, Rowdy. Carroll did not visit the house after her daughter moved. The VanScoys sent their rental payments to Carroll, who was an absentee landlord, living in Washington, D.C.
The plaintiff, Karrlinda, was a threeyear- old who lived two houses down and across an intersection from the VanScoys. The child’s mother had observed the VanScoy children with dogs in their front yard, with no evidence of aggression by the dogs. Karrlinda was at the VanScoys’ house playing, and the dog, “Rowdy,” was chained in the back yard. Exactly what happened is not known. It is sufficient to state that the child did get into the back yard and was attacked by Rowdy. However, the Court was reluctant to hold the absentee landlord liable because the plaintiff could not prove that:
1. The attacking dog, “Rowdy,” was of a vicious breed;
2. Carroll’s daughter had any knowledge that the dog, Rowdy, was of a vicious propensity;
3. Carroll had any direct knowledge dogs were kept on the rental premises;
4. Carroll in any way contributed to the maintenance of the dog, Rowdy;
5. Carroll had or exercised any care, custody or control over the actions of the dog Rowdy; or
6. Carroll in any manner violated the Oklahoma City ordinance by “harboring” a vicious animal.
The Bishop case is a useful guide to see what factors the Court relied upon to determine whether a landlord could be held liable for his or her acts of the tenant’s animals. However, many landlords clearly know their tenants have pets. Despite such, the Bishop case shows that plaintiffs have a tough evidentiary challenge to prove the landlords knew that the dogs were vicious and exercised control over the dog.
That same year, the Court was again asked to address this issue in Robison v. Stokes. In Robinson, another Tulsa case, the lease actually allowed for pets; however, the evidence still showed that the landlord did not know the tenant had a pet, let alone a vicious one. Therefore, the Court would not hold the landlord responsible for the tenant’s dog attack.
This issue arose again in 2009, in Eastin v. Aggarwal. Like the Bishop case, a neighbor child was injured by a renter’s dog. The Court was again reluctant to hold the landlord liable for the tenant’s dog because of the following:
1. The landlord lease specifically barred tenants from keeping or harboring pets of any kind on the premises;
2. The landlord had no knowledge of any dog being harbored by the tenants;
3. The landlords were residing primarily outside of Oklahoma;
4. The landlords had not cared for, maintained, kept, harbored, possessed, controlled, or had custody of any vicious dog at the residential rental property;
5. The plaintiff testified she was not aware of any incidents in which the dog in question showed any signs of aggressiveness to another human being or animal;
6. Plaintiff was not aware of any reports or complaints made to any City of Tulsa authority, police agency or dog pound regarding the dog’s previous behavior;
7. Plaintiff was not aware of any facts that would suggest the landlord was aware of the existence of the dog in question;
8. Plaintiff testified that other than the occupants of the rental property, she was not aware of anyone else that had cared for, maintained, kept, harbored, possessed, controlled, or had custody of the dog in question.
In a recent 2010 Oklahoma Court decision, the same issue was again tested with Taylor v. Glenn. In that case, as like the others, it was proven that the lease prohibited dogs and that the landlord had no knowledge that the tenant was keeping a Pit Bull on the leased premises. Although the landlord only lived a few miles away, the Court refused to hold her liable for the victim’s damages caused by her tenant’s dog.
So, it appears Oklahoma Courts are not likely to hold an absentee landlord responsible for their tenant’s dogs. And despite other instances where the landlord knows of the tenant having a dog, it would still have to be proven that:
1. The landlord knew the dog was vicious;
2. The landlord had some type of control over the dog.
One could argue that the landlord meets both of these elements if it is proven that he or she had knowledge the dog was vicious or the propensity to be vicious (knowing element) and failed to remove the dog from the premises (control element). As a word of caution, there could be a reason our appellate Courts have not had a case where the landlord knew of those elements. That may simply be because those cases settle with the insurance company and never make it to court.
